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Harmonizing Corporate Income Taxes
in the European Community: Rationale
and Implications
Charles E. McLure, Jr, Hoover Institution, Stanford University and NBER
Executive Summary
The member states of the European Community (EC) have systems of
taxing corporate income that were designed for nations, not for mem-
bers of an economic union. This paper describes the problems of the
present system, which is based on separate accounting and arm’s length
pricing, the advantages of one based on consolidation and formula ap-
portionment such as that employed by the U.S. states (and Canadian
provinces), the likely characteristics of such a system, the complications
caused by income ﬂows to and from the EC, and the implications of har-
monization, for both EC member states and non-EC nations and for
multinational corporations. It seems virtually certain that a harmonized
EC system (like that of Canada) would exhibit far more uniformity than
state corporate income taxes in the United States and, like some state
taxes (but unlike the Canadian system), would involve consolidation of
the activities of corporations characterized by high levels of common
ownership and control. Finally, the paper speculates on the prospects
for harmonization, given(a) that adoption of tax measures applicable to
all member states requires the unanimous approval of all EC member
states, but (b) as few as eight member states could harmonize their taxes
through enhanced cooperation.
5.1 Introduction
The member states of the European Community (EC, or the Commu-
nity) impose corporate income taxes1 that were designed for totally in-
dependent nations, not for members of an economically integrated
union.2 The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has underlined this fact re-peatedly in decisions ruling that various aspects of the tax policies of
Member States violate the EC Treaty, the de facto constitution of the EC.3
In March 2000, at its meeting in Lisbon, the European Council (com-
prised of the Heads of State or Government of EU Member States)
adopted what have come to be called the Lisbon goals: “a new strategic
goalfor the next decade: to become the most competitive and dynamic knowl-
edge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with
more and better jobs and greater social cohesion.”4 At the end of 2001 the Eu-
ropean Commission—the executive body of the EC, hereinafter “the
Commission”—stated that “reform of EU company taxation is crucial
for achieving the Lisbon-goals”5 and suggested that the EC Member
States should harmonize their corporate income taxes, a view the Com-
mission has reiterated repeatedly since then.6
The type of harmonized system currently being considered, called the
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), resembles in key re-
spects—but not others—the systems the United States and Canadian
provinces employ to tax corporate income.7In particular, there would be a
common deﬁnition of taxable income and an agreed-upon formula would
be used to apportion the consolidated income of certain groups of corpo-
rations among the EC member states where the members of the corporate
group do business.8Both the Commission and the European business com-
munity have insisted that taxation under the CCCTB scheme could be op-
tional for corporate groups—that is, that corporations and corporate
groups should have the option to continue to be taxed under the national
tax systems of the various member states where they operate.9 Signiﬁ-
cantly, the Commission has stated repeatedly and unequivocally that it
would not propose harmonization of statutory tax rates, leaving the setting
of rates to the discretion of individual member states. For example, it states
(CEC 2001a, 9), “the level of taxation in this area is however a matter for the
Member States to decide, in accordance with the principles of subsidiarity.”
Thus far the Commission’s suggestion that corporate taxes be harmo-
nized has had a cool reception in several member states, most notably in
Ireland and the United Kingdom, but also in Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia,
Malta, and Cyprus, all of which joined the EC in 2004. This suggests that
a formal proposal for harmonization would not enjoy the unanimous sup-
port that would be required for it to be adopted by the EC. Thus, in its 2001
report the Commission (CEC 2001b) suggested that participation in the
CCCTB should also be optional for member states. More recently, realiz-
ing that merely being able to opt out of the CCCTB system might not sat-
isfy the opponents of harmonization, the Commission (CEC 2004a) has
152 McLureproposed that as few as eight member states could proceed through en-
hanced cooperation to harmonize their corporate tax systems, and in late
2004 it convened the CCCTB Working Group to begin ironing out the
many technical details of a proposal for harmonization that it plans to sub-
mit to the Council by the end of 2008.10
Corporate tax harmonization is not a sure bet, certainly not in the short
term. But the EC member states will ﬁnd it difﬁcult to continue indeﬁ-
nitely to follow the independent nation paradigm. The next section sets
the stage for the discussion that follows, ﬁrst by providing basic data on
corporate tax rates and the percentage of GDP represented by corporate
tax revenues in EC member states and then by illustrating in general
terms how a system based on consolidation and apportionment would
work. Section 3 explains the rationale for harmonization, section 4 de-
scribes areas where there seems to be general agreement regarding the
proper contours of harmonization, although signiﬁcant questions re-
main regarding details, and section 5 discusses international issues, in-
cluding the role of residence-based taxation in the CCCTB. Section 6 dis-
cusses in greater detail whether and why harmonization will eventually
occur and section 7 examines some of the implications of harmonization,
including those for nations outside the EC. It will be convenient to ignore
for the most part—as Commission Services has in most of its analysis—
the possibility that only a subset of Member States may initially adopt the
CCCTB and that the scheme will likely be optional for ﬁrms.
5.2 Setting the Stage: Some Preliminaries
5.2.1 Basic Facts on Corporate Taxes in the EC
Table 5.1 presents basic facts about reliance on corporate income taxes in
the EC. Statutory rates vary from 10 percent in Bulgaria and Cyprus and
12.5 percent in Ireland, to 38.7 in Germany and 37.3 percent in Italy. Statu-
tory rates are substantially lower, on average, than in 1995. The un-
weighted average of statutory rates in all twenty-seven member states has
fallen by almost 11 percentage points (from 35.3 percent to 24.5 percent)
and that for the thirteen member states that comprise the Euro zone (the
ﬁfteen member states as of May 1, 2004, minus Sweden and the United
Kingdom) has dropped by 10 percentage points, from 38.5 percent to 28.5
percent. Differences in statutory rates create incentives for income shift-
ing of the type to be described below. The risk of income shifting, in turn,
is one of the pressures member states feel to lower statutory rates.
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Adjusted Top Statutory Tax Rate on Corporate Income, 1995 and 2007, and Corporate In-
come Tax as Percent of GDP, 1995 and 2005
Corporate Income Tax 
as % of GDP Top Statutory Tax Rates
Member State 1995 2007 Difference 1995 2005 Difference
Belgium 40.2 34.0 –6.2 2.3 3.5 1.1
Bulgaria 40.0 10.0 –30.0 – 3.1 –
Czech Republic 41.0 24.0 –17.0 4.6 4.5 –0.1
Denmark 34.0 28.0 –6.0 2.3 3.8 1.5
Germany 56.8 38.7 –18.1 2.1 2.5 0.5
Estonia 26.0 22.0 –4.0 2.4 1.4 –1.0
Ireland 40.0 12.5 –27.5 2.7 3.4 0.7
Greece 40.0 25.0 –15.0 2.6 3.6 0.9
Spain 35.0 32.5 –2.5 1.9 3.9 2.1
France 36.7 34.4 –2.2 1.8 2.4 0.7
Italy 52.2 37.3 –15.0 2.9 2.9 0.0
Cyprus 25.0 10.0 –15.0 4.2 4.7 0.4
Latvia 25.0 15.0 –10.0 1.8 2.0 0.2
Lithuania 29.0 18.0 –11.0 2.1 2.1 0.0
Luxemburg 40.9 29.6 –11.3 6.6 6.0 –0.6
Hungary 19.6 18.6 –1.1 1.9 2.2 0.3
Malta 35.0 35.0 0.0 2.7 4.0 1.3
Netherlands 35.0 25.5 –9.5 3.3 3.7 0.4
Austria 34.0 25.0 –9.0 1.6 2.3 0.7
Poland 40.0 19.0 –21.0 2.7 2.5 –0.2
Portugal 39.6 26.5 –13.1 2.4 3.0# 0.6#
Romania 38.0 16.0 –22.0 – 2.7 –
Slovenia 25.0 23.0 –2.0 0.5 2.9 2.3
Slovakia 40.0 19.0 –21.0 6.8 2.8 4.0
Finland 25.0 26.0 1.0 2.3 3.3 1.0
Sweden 28.0 28.0 0.0 2.6 3.8 1.1
United Kingdom 33.0 30.0 –3.0 2.9 3.4 0.6
Average, EU–27 35.3 24.5 –10.8 2.3  3.0  0.7 
Average, EU–13 38.5 28.5 –10.0 2.2  2.9  0.7 
Source: CEC, Taxation Trends in the European Union, 2007: Main Results, Table B.
# 2004
 Weighted averageCorporate income tax revenues (as a percent of GDP) in 2005 ranged
from 1.4 percent in Estonia, where only income that is distributed to
shareholders is subject to tax, to 6 percent in Luxemburg. Between 1995
and 2005 the weighted average of this percentage fell by 0.7 percentage
points for all twenty-seven member states, as well as for the thirteen
member states in the Euro zone. This suggests that rate reduction was
accompanied by base broadening.11
5.2.2 An Illustration of Consolidation cum Apportionment
The following example shows how apportionment would work, in the
context of both two individual corporations that are not consolidated
and a consolidated group comprised of the two corporations. Assume
(a) that corporation Aoperates in (and has taxable nexus in) jurisdictions
1 and 2 and that corporation B operates in (and has taxable nexus in) ju-
risdictions 2 and 3; (b) that the apportionment formula used by all three
jurisdictions accords equal weight to payroll and sales, as in Canada;
and (c) that the two corporations have the income and the apportion-
ment factors shown in table 5.2.12
Suppose, ﬁrst, that activities of the two corporations are not consoli-
dated. Since corporation Ahas 40 percent of its payroll and 60 percent of
its sales in jurisdiction 1, the equally weighted two-factor formula as-
signs half of its total income of 1000 to that jurisdiction (and the other half
to jurisdiction 2). The calculation is even simpler for corporation B—
since it has 40 percent of both payroll and sales in jurisdiction 2 and 60
percent of both in jurisdiction 3, the two jurisdictions are assigned those
fractions of its income of 2000.
If the two corporations are consolidated, their payroll and sales are
aggregated to calculate the group’s two apportionment factors in each of
the three jurisdictions and the consolidated income of the group (three
thousand dollars) is multiplied by the weighted average of the two ap-
portionment factors of the group (in this case, the simple average since
the factors are weighted equally) to determine the division of the tax
base among the three jurisdictions.13
5.3 The Rationale for Harmonization
The rationale for harmonization lies in the defects of the present method
of taxing corporate income in the EC.14



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































55.3.1 Lack of Uniformity
The ﬁrst C in CCCTB stands for common. Acommon or uniform system
would counteract the effects of non uniformity.15
Complexity A corporate group operating throughout the EC must
comply with the tax laws of twenty-seven member states and must deal
with the tax administrations and legal systems of all those jurisdictions.
There is no equivalent to the U.S. Internal Revenue Code (which states
take as the starting point in deﬁning taxable income) or to the Internal
Revenue Service (which the states rely on for the heavy lifting of tax ad-
ministration).
What Europeans call negative harmonization occurs when the ECJ ﬁnds
that a tax provision contravenes the EC Treaty. But such proscriptive har-
monization does not necessarily produce uniformity, as there are usually
many ways member states can—and do—respond to a given ECJ decision.
Complexity impedes the functioning of the internal market, espe-
cially by discouraging small and medium enterprises from expanding
into additional member states. Harmonization of tax laws and adminis-
tration would reduce complexity.
Uncertainty The existence of twenty-seven separate tax systems also
increases uncertainty for taxpayers, likely discouraging investment.16
The meaning of the tax laws of individual member states may be unclear
(especially to outsiders), administrative and judicial interpretations of
laws may be arbitrary or even capricious, and laws and interpretations
may be subject to frequent change. Even when ECJ decisions appear to
beneﬁt taxpayers, they may also increase uncertainty, because of the dif-
ﬁculty of predicting how various member states will react to them.
Harmonization may reduce uncertainty by providing statutes and in-
terpretations that are uniform—and applied uniformly—and by reducing
the need for the ECJ to rule on cross-border tax matters. Because of the dif-
ﬁculty of modifying laws legislated jointly by numerous member states,
stability is also likely to be enhanced. While stability may generally be de-
sirable, it can (of course) also be problematical if it hinders needed change.
5.3.2 Reliance on Separate Accounting 
and the Arm’s Length Standard
The second C in CCCTB stands for consolidated. Consolidation of the
activities of corporate groups for tax purposes would alleviate the prob-
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length standard (SA/ALS), which is the norm in the EC as well as in in-
ternational taxation more broadly.
One of the key questions that all tax systems must answer is how much
of the income of a multijurisdictional corporate group should be attrib-
uted to the taxing jurisdiction. In the international arena this is done by
application of entity-based SA/ALS. That is, separately incorporated en-
tities are ordinarily treated as distinct taxpayers17 and—in determining
the income of each—it is assumed that transactions between afﬁliated
entities occur at prices that would be observed in transactions between
entities operating at arm’s length. If separate entities are employed to
conduct business in each nation, SA/ALS provides an answer to the in-
come attribution problem.18 If branches (permanent establishments or
PEs) are used to conduct business, jurisdictions where branches are lo-
cated also employ separate accounting to isolate their income.
Transfer Pricing Applying the methodology of SA/ALS to economic
relations in the context of an economically integrated union is fraught
with problems. First, because of the nature of the modern multinational
corporation there may be few (if any) comparable transactions with un-
related entities involving the goods and services for which transfer
prices are sought, and the terms of transactions by competitors may not
be observable (even if they would be comparable). These problems are
especially serious in sectors where intangible assets are the crown jew-
els of the corporation, such as computer software and pharmaceuti-
cals.19 More fundamentally, economic interdependence between vari-
ous parts of a corporate group may make it conceptually impossible to
identify arm’s length prices.
Second, since transfer pricing methodologies provide, at best, a range
of acceptable transfer prices, taxpayers may be able to manipulate trans-
fer prices to shift income from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions. This al-
most certainly helps explain both the extraordinarily high rates of proﬁt
reported in Ireland—which until recently had the lowest corporate tax
rate in the EC—and Ireland’s resistance to corporate tax harmonization.
Honohan and Walsh (2002, 39–40) write evocatively regarding indus-
tries estimated to have annual rates of return on capital invested in Ire-
land in excess of 10 percent:
[T]hese are all industries characterized by highly valuable patented products.
Most of the research and development that went into producing these goods
158 McLurewas conducted in afﬁliates of these enterprises in other countries, mainly the
United States....  I n  effect, since Ireland has by far the lowest standard rate of
tax on manufacturing among the advanced economies, these transactions are
booked at transfer prices that have the effect of locating a very large fraction of
the enterprise’s global proﬁts in Ireland....   What is clear is that, in many cases,
the huge proﬁts recorded by the Irish afﬁliates have little to do with the manu-
facturing activities conducted in Ireland.20
Third, in an effort to prevent income shifting, many nations have im-
posed increasingly onerous requirements for documentation of transfer
prices. EC parent corporations with subsidiaries in other member states
have identiﬁed compliance with requirements to document transfer
prices as their principal compliance problem. Reporting on the results of
a European Tax Survey, a Commission staff working paper (CEC 2004b)
states. “The estimates highlight that transfer pricing is an important is-
sue for 82.8% of large companies, in particular when it comes to dealing
with documentation requirements, which are a difﬁculty for 81.9% of
the large companies.”
Fourth, the tax authorities of member states cannot always agree on
transfer prices—despite the existence of advance pricing agreements,
mutual agreement procedures, and the recent establishment of the EC
Transfer Pricing Forum. When this happens, multiple taxation may oc-
cur.
Finally, in a closely integrated economic union it may not make sense
from a business point of view to employ a separate legal entity to oper-
ate in each member state or to keep separate accounts for branches op-
erating in various member states, even if those qualify as PEs under or-
dinary deﬁnitions and international practices. Doing so could clearly be
an unproductive activity, especially for small and medium-sized busi-
nesses, and requiring it would be contrary to the Lisbon objectives.
If geographic SA/ALS were used to determine the income to be at-
tributed to each jurisdiction, it would encounter all the problems just de-
scribed. Beyond that, it would be inefﬁcient and contrary to the Lisbon
objectives to require geographic separate accounting for tax purposes,
since it would not likely be needed for any other reason.
Consolidation would eliminate the need for transfer pricing of trans-
actions occurring within the consolidated group and, thus, all the prob-
lems just described, since all such transactions would be ignored. To the
extent that member states or corporate groups did not participate in CC-
CTB, transfer pricing problems would remain. And, of course, transfer
pricing would still be required and would continue to cause problems
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havens. Introduction of the CCCTB system would, however, free up ad-
ministrative resources of participating member states to deal with these
problems.
Financial Structure Multinational corporations have an incentive to
borrow in member states where tax rates are high, in order to maximize
the tax saving from interest deductions.21 Some countries employ thin
capitalization rules to limit interest deductions, but the ECJ has found
that such rules violate the EC Treaty if they distinguish between resi-
dents of the taxing member state and residents other member states.22
Consolidation and formula apportionment would eliminate the in-
centive to borrow in high-tax member states to ﬁnance investments in
low-tax member states, by effectively allocating interest deductions
among member states, no matter where borrowing occurs. As with
transfer pricing, if corporations or low-tax member states did not par-
ticipate in the CCCTB there would still be an incentive to borrow in
high-tax member states (or in participating member states). Moreover,
the CCCTB would not eliminate the need for thin capitalization rules to
be applied to debt involving non-EU entities.
Different Taxation of Various Types of Income In the present system,
different types of income may be taxed differently. Business proﬁts are
taxed on a net basis by the member state where they are deemed to orig-
inate (the source jurisdiction), but source jurisdictions tax interest, roy-
alties, and dividends on a gross basis (with no deductions for costs of
earning the income), if at all.23 Deductions are allowed for interest and
royalties, but not for dividends. The characterization and geographic
source of income is, therefore, crucial. By comparison, under consolida-
tion all ﬂows of income (like other transactions) within the consolidated
group would be ignored and the aggregate income of the consolidated
group would be apportioned by formula. Thus, the nature and geo-
graphic source of income within participating member states would no
longer matter.
Lack of Loss Offset EC member states allow only very limited ability
to offset losses incurred in one member state against proﬁts earned else-
where in the EC.24 In a recent decision, the ECJ ruled that member states
are not required to allow corporate parents to take deductions for losses
subsidiaries incur in other member states, unless all possibility of relief
160 McLureby the other member state has been exhausted.25 The limited ability to
offset losses discourages risky cross-border investment and—because
of the difference in size of their internal markets—gives the larger mem-
ber states an artiﬁcial advantage over the smaller ones in attracting in-
vestment. Consolidation automatically provides complete loss offset,
including horizontal loss offset (i.e., losses of one subsidiary against
proﬁts of another), as well as vertical loss offset (losses of a subsidiary
against proﬁts of the parent).
Tax Consequences of Reorganizations Despite the existence of the EC
directive on mergers, reorganizations of corporate groups that extend
across boundaries between member states may have tax consequences
(e.g., deemed realization of capital gains) that impede cross-border in-
vestment.
Gaps and Overlaps in Taxation Gaps and overlaps in taxation can oc-
cur to the extent that tax systems—including deﬁnitions of taxable in-
come and administrative practices, especially in regards to transfer
prices—are not mutually consistent. The lack of loss offset means that
the income of a group is not truly taxed on a net basis. The universal
adoption of a common deﬁnition of income, a common method of con-
solidation, and a common apportionment formula would go a long way
toward eliminating gaps and overlaps in the taxation of EC-source in-
come.26 Of course, if not all member states—and not all corporations—
were to participate in CCCTB, gaps and overlaps in taxation could re-
main.
An Example A simple example illustrates some of the problems with
SA/ALS and indicates how consolidation and formula apportionment
would address these issues.27 Suppose that a multinational group head-
quartered in Luxembourg uses legally separate entities chartered in
each member state to engage in the following closely integrated activi-
ties in the member state indicated: research in the United Kingdom, ﬁ-
nancing in Germany, production in Ireland, and sales that are proﬁtable
(as measured by SA/ALS) in France and Belgium, but unproﬁtable in
Italy. Under current practice, each of the seven member states identiﬁed
would employ SA/ALS based on relevant domestic law (perhaps as
modiﬁed by treaties) to determine the income of the entity subject to its
jurisdiction. It would, thus, be necessary for each member state to de-
termine the nature and geographic source of all income ﬂows to or from
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to employ in valuing transactions occurring between the various mem-
bers of the corporate group—that is, for headquarters activities, ﬁnanc-
ing, research, and the sale of ﬁnal products. Transfer prices may be ma-
nipulated to shift income to Ireland, which has the lowest corporate tax
rate; arm’s length prices may not exist for some transactions, for ex-
ample, for royalties paid for the fruits of research activities; and member
states may not agree on particular transfer prices. Absent ECJ prohibi-
tion, Germany might apply its thin capitalization rules to limit the rev-
enue effects of interest deductions. Also, the Italian losses cannot be
used to offset income earned in other member states. This system is
clearly complex and there is little reason to expect that gaps and over-
laps in taxation would not occur.
Assuming that these seven member states and the corporate group
participated in CCCTB, all activities occurring within the seven member
states would be consolidated and the aggregate net income therefrom
would be apportioned among the seven through the use of a common
formula. Transfer pricing for tax purposes would not be needed for
transactions occurring within the group, and the Italian losses would
automatically be offset against income earned elsewhere.28 Under CC-
CTB the deﬁnition of the tax base, the rules for consolidation, and the ap-
portionment formula would all be uniform. CCCTB would be simpler
than the present system and, at least within these seven member states,
there would be no gaps or overlaps in taxation.
5.3.3 Problems of Consolidation cum Apportionment
Consolidation cum apportionment is not without problems. First, there
are no scientiﬁcally defensible and easily implemented answers to two
crucial questions: the proper deﬁnition of the group whose activities are
to be consolidated and the best apportionment formula to use to divide
consolidated income among member states. These issues are discussed
further in the next section.
Second, the outcome of apportionment is inevitably arbitrary. Thus,
while this methodology may, on average, produce a division of income
among jurisdictions that approximates the true division, it may not do
so for any particular taxpayer under all circumstances. In deciding
whether this is an acceptable price to pay to avoid the problems of SA/
ALS described previously, it is necessary to remember that—despite its
162 McLureconceptual attractiveness—SA/ALS also may not accurately determine
the true source of income.
Third, taxation based on formula apportionment may distort the lo-
cation of economic activity. This is most easily understood by appreciat-
ing that a tax that is apportioned according to a formula is economically
similar to a tax levied on the factors in the apportionment formula.29 If,
for example, payroll and property are used to apportion income, a tax
on apportioned income resembles a tax on payroll and property. This is,
however, an incomplete diagnosis of the distortionary effects of replac-
ing SA/ALS with consolidation cum apportionment. After all, a tax
based on SA/ALS that accurately captures the geographic source of in-
come may also distort the location of economic activity, although per-
haps in a different manner. Only if—and to the extent that—a tax based
on SA/ALS falls on location-speciﬁc economic proﬁts or can be avoided
by shifting income for tax purposes—for example, by manipulating
transfer prices—will it not affect the location of economic activity. Note
that an apportioned tax on economic proﬁts does distort locational
choices. Many would consider the ease of avoiding a tax based on SA/
ALS through income shifting an anomalous reason to prefer SA/ALS
over consolidation cum apportionment from the viewpoint of neutral-
ity toward economic location.
Finally, the use of consolidation cum apportionment within a limited
geographic area such as the EC may not be easily reconciled with the
worldwide use of SA/ALS to determine the source of income. There are
three types of issues. The ﬁrst is whether, in principle, the two systems
can be reconciled. The second is whether they can be reconciled in prac-
tice, given both that the various EC member states treat foreign-source
income differently and that they have double taxation treaties based on
SA/ALS with many foreign nations. Section 5 examines these. Issues
that arise if not all EC member states participate in the CCCTB (consid-
eration of which the working group has deferred) are mentioned at var-
ious points, but not examined in detail.30
5.3.4 Corporate Tax Rates: the Elephant in the Room.
It may seem rather anomalous that the Commission has repeatedly
stated explicitly that it has no intention of harmonizing corporate tax
rates, given (a) that differences in marginal effective tax rates can distort
the location of economic activity, (b) that a large portion of the staff pa-
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to quantifying the large differences in marginal effective tax rates pre-
vailing in various member states, (c) that differences in statutory tax
rates were by far the most important reason for differences in effective
tax rates, and (d) that differences in marginal effective tax rates would
become even greater if tax bases were harmonized, but rates were not
changed.31 Sørensen (2004, 103) notes, “. . . many tax experts ﬁnd it par-
adoxical that the commission emphatically rejects any form of coordi-
nation of corporate tax rates, despite the ﬁnding in the report that about
three fourths of the current dispersion of effective corporate tax rates in
the EU are due to differences on statutory tax rates.” Some argue that
rates, as well as tax bases, should be harmonized in order to reduce dis-
tortions of the location of economic activity and to reduce tax competi-
tion.
By comparison, both the Commission and the business community
have insisted strongly on member state sovereignty over rates, as a means
of promoting tax competition among member states, keeping tax rates
down, restraining the growth of government, and avoiding adverse effects
on the competitive capacity of EU business. The Commission has stated:
a reasonable degree of tax competition within the EU is healthy and should be
allowed to operate. Tax competition may strengthen ﬁscal discipline to the ex-
tent that it encourages Member States to streamline their public expenditure,
thus allowing a durable reduction in the overall tax burden.32
It is possible that—by increasing transparency—harmonization of tax
bases will induce greater tax competition, which would then be conﬁned
to tax rates. As explained further in the following, competitive effects
would depend (in part) on the apportionment formula chosen; tax com-
petition would be greater if apportionment were based on the location of
payroll or property, the origin of value added, or the origin of sales than
if it were based on macro factors or the destination of sales.33 Note that
macro factors and value added at origin should probably be omitted
from this comparison because of the fatal defects identiﬁed below.
Some fear that once the tax base is harmonized, the Commission will
move on to advocate rate harmonization. For example, Graetz and Warren
(2006, 1229) write, “One cannot help but ask whether the Commission’s on-
going efforts to harmonize corporate tax bases is—despite its protesta-
tions—simply a stalking horse for a subsequent push to conform rates.”
These authors, along with many others, decry the loss of sovereignty over
tax policy implied by harmonization of tax bases—noting that member
164 McLurestates could no longer use tax policy (except as expressed in the level of
rates) to further their economic objectives. Critics of this view argue that
the exercise of sovereignty in the corporate tax area, except in regard to
rates, seems often to run counter to the creation of a single market.34
5.4 The Likely Contours of Harmonization
It seems virtually certain that any proposal for a Common Consolidated
Corporate Tax Base would contain three key elements: a common tax
base, consolidation, and formula apportionment.35 Unlike the situation
in the United States, where the states are allowed—and exercise—great
latitude in regard to these matters, in the EC uniformity would likely ex-
tend beyond the tax base to include the criterion (or criteria) for consol-
idation and the apportionment formula (or formulas) used to divide in-
come, including the deﬁnition of the factors in the formula (sometimes
called keys in the EC). But the deﬁnition of apportionable income, the
basis for consolidation, and the apportionment formula are still unset-
tled. Even so, it is possible to discern some aspects of the form harmo-
nization is likely to take.36
5.4.1 Optional Corporate Participation
As noted earlier, there is general agreement that corporate participation
in the CCCTB system should be optional. In order to prevent a situation
where some members of a group of afﬁliated corporations participate
and others do not, in order to game the system, Commission Services
has proposed that all members of groups linked by more than 50 percent
common ownership must either opt in or opt out of CCCTB.37 As noted
later, where common ownership exceeds 75 percent, mandatory consol-
idation would be required of those opting in.
5.4.2 Common Tax Base
In order to reduce complexity substantially, it is necessary that there be
a common tax base. This is a tall order, and not only because the income
tax laws of the twenty-seven member states currently differ signiﬁcantly
in important respects. First, contrary to the situation with free trade or
the taxation of value added, there is no single objectively defensible def-
inition of income for tax purposes. Second, and probably more impor-
tant, contrary to the situation in the United States and Canada, there is
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come from which EC member states can start in deﬁning apportionable
income.
Commission Services favors taking International Financial Reporting
Standards (IFRS, formerly called International Accounting Standards or
IAS, the international equivalent of GAAP) as the starting point for the
measurement of income, but recognizes that “it is not possible to make
a formal link between the base and IAS/IFRS.” Rather, the tax base
would be computed by reference to national GAAP in the various mem-
ber states.38 Commission Services supports basing taxation on accrual
but with somewhat more emphasis on realization than is found in IFRS.
Also, the Commission believes that the deﬁnition of income should be
chosen with the Lisbon objectives in mind.
Among the many issues in this area the CCCTB Working Group has
addressed, depreciation allowances are among the most important.
Commission Services has suggested that separate accounts be main-
tained for individual buildings and other long term tangible assets,
which would be depreciated on a straight-line basis (2.5 percent per year
for buildings, 4 percent per year for other long-term assets). By compar-
ison, short- and medium-term assets would be pooled, with 20 percent
of the undepreciated basis written off each year.39
It will be necessary to employ arm’s length prices for transactions be-
tween related parties that are not part of a consolidated group. Com-
mission Services has suggested that for this purpose related parties
should be deﬁned as those related by a minimum of 20 percent common
ownership, as measured by voting rights.40
An issue that arises much more prominently in the EC than in the
United States is how to treat taxes the member states collect to ﬁnance
social insurance. If such taxes are deductible, because of apportionment,
all member states would (in effect) share in the cost of social insurance
provided by any member state.41 Actually, the same issue arises with
any tax that is used to ﬁnance an extraordinarily high level of public ser-
vice in a particular member state. Commission Services has suggested
that certain local taxes should be deducted from member state shares of
the consolidated tax base, which would be calculated without allowing
deductions for such taxes.42
It may be worthwhile to mention several areas in which the EC seems
unlikely to follow U.S. state practice in deﬁning the tax base. First, Com-
mission Services has suggested that the EC not distinguish between
business income (apportioned in the United States) and non business in-
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consolidated group income.43
Second, depending on the degree of common ownership of the
payor, intercorporate dividends may be subjected to three taxing
regimes that can differ from those in the United States.44 Dividends
ﬂowing between members of a consolidated group would be ignored,
as by U.S. states that provide for combined reports (the U.S. equivalent
of consolidation). As noted below, consolidation would be mandatory
under certain circumstances—unlike the situation in many U.S. states.
Consistent with the parent-subsidiary directive, the EC seems likely to
exempt intercorporate dividends paid by majority-owned EC sub-
sidiaries that are not part of a consolidated group. Finally, Commission
Services has suggested that dividends from portfolio investment in
EC corporations be subject to a tax and credit scheme. See the discus-
sion accompanying table 5.3. In the United States, the federal govern-
ment exempts most intercorporate dividends but the states commonly
do not.45
5.4.3 Consolidation
It seems virtually certain that the activities of certain related entities
would be consolidated for tax purposes. The Commission and its staff
have repeatedly expressed a preference for consolidation (CEC 2006a, 7;
2007c, 21). As noted earlier, consolidation would eliminate several of the
problems of SA/ALS: those associated with transfer pricing, differences
in the tax treatment of various types of income, the use of ﬁnancial struc-
ture to shift income, and lack of loss offset. With consolidation, ﬂows of
income (and other transactions) between members of the consolidated
group would be ignored, there would be no need to calculate transfer
prices on such transactions, and losses of one member of the group
would automatically be offset against proﬁts of other members of the
group.
Commission Services favors a criterion for consolidation based on
common ownership or control. Consolidation would be mandatory for
parents, PEs located in the EC, and EC subsidiaries with more than 75
percent common ownership, either direct or indirect (termed qualiﬁed
subsidiaries).46 While the favored approach might be susceptible to tax
planning, it would be relatively simple and objective, unlike a more sub-
jective criterion based on the existence of a unitary business, which is re-
quired under U.S. jurisprudence for mandatory combination.47
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Under the CCCTB, a formula (rather than SA/ALS) would be used to di-
vide the income of corporate groups—which could consist of a single
corporation with branches in various member states—among the vari-
ous member states in which the members of a group operate. In Canada,
for example, all the provinces use a formula that accords equal weight
to the fractions of the taxpayer’s total payroll and sales located in the
province. Signiﬁcantly, in Canada, the provinces—following the lead of
the federal government—do not allow or require consolidation. By
comparison, the formulas that most U.S. states employ consider the in-
state fractions of payroll, property, and sales, but not all states apply the
same weights to the three factors and some use only sales to apportion
corporate income.
The choice of apportionment formula involves the balancing of sev-
eral objectives, including (a) the reﬂection of where income originates,
(b) the distortion of decisions on the location of economic activities, (c)
the likelihood of tax competition (which some see as positive and others
see as negative), (d) the risk that the taxpayer will manipulate appor-
tionment factors to shift income to low-tax member states, (e) the distri-
bution of revenues among member states, and (f) the ease of implemen-
tation.48For example, a formula that reﬂects the origin of income is likely
to distort the location of economic activity and give rise to tax competi-
tion.
Commission Services has discussed three basic approaches, only one
of which seems viable. Under the macro approach, the consolidated in-
come of a corporate group would be divided among member states in
proportion to their shares in some EC wide variable such as GDP. For ex-
ample, if the GDP of member state X was 15 percent of the GDP of the
EC, 15 percent of the tax base of all corporate groups opting for CCTB
would be attributed to that member state.49 While this approach would
be simple and eliminate all locational distortions, tax competition, and
opportunities for manipulation, it has the obvious and perhaps fatal
ﬂaw that the amount of a group’s taxable income attributed to a partic-
ular member state would bear no necessary relationship to its economic
activity there. Besides failing to accord with common notions of fairness,
this approach would create a perverse incentive for member states to
raise their tax rates, since doing so would not greatly discourage eco-
nomic activity within their borders. But the implied race-to-the-top in
tax rates would discourage investment in the EC and clearly be contrary
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now.50
Asecond approach would apportion a group’s taxable income among
member states in proportion to the group’s value added in the various
jurisdictions, with value added being measured on an origin basis. This
approach would be conceptually attractive, as it may reﬂect fairly accu-
rately where (on average) income originates. It may also be consistent
with beneﬁt-based taxation, but to the extent that it is not, it would dis-
tort the location of economic activity and encourage undesirable tax
competition. Moreover, the necessity of valuing exports and imports
would reintroduce transfer pricing problems, one of the shortcomings
of SA/ALS that the CCCTB is intended to overcome. This approach has
also been shelved.51
The ﬁnal alternative, and the only one under active consideration, is
to employ arbitrary factors such as payroll, property, and sales to ap-
portion income, as in the United States and Canada. Commission Ser-
vices and the CCCTB Working Group are currently discussing which
factors to use, what weights to attach to them, and how to deﬁne them.
While there seems to be strong support for using payroll and property
to apportion income, support for also using sales appears to be much
weaker.52
Among the key issues being discussed regarding the deﬁnition of the
payroll factor are whether to have a common deﬁnition of employees or
to rely on deﬁnitions of the various member states; the value to be
placed on payroll, with Commission Services suggesting the amount
that is allowed as a tax-deductible expense; the treatment of outsourced
services; the treatment of temporary or interim staff; the basis for as-
signing payroll to particular member states (e.g., where services are per-
formed); and whether adjustments should be made to reﬂect differences
in wage rates in the various member states. A possible compromise on
the last issue would involve temporarily using the number of employ-
ees in conjunction with payrolls.53
Commission Services has suggested that property be measured as a
stock, rather than as a ﬂow.54 Among the most intractable problems in
this area is how to reﬂect the contribution of intangibles such as intel-
lectual property in an apportionment formula (McLure 1997). That is,
what value should be placed on such intangibles and what is their loca-
tion? Recognizing these problems, the fact that the payroll and property
factors may reﬂect the location of intangibles, and the risk that the loca-
tion of intangibles could be manipulated, Commission Services has sug-
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property factor. Other issues being discussed are where property should
be assigned, its valuation (e.g., historical costs, as in the United States, or
historical cost written down for depreciation), and the treatment of
rented and leased assets.55
Inclusion of a sales factor in the apportionment formula, and on what ba-
sis, has been the most controversial issue in the choice of the apportion-
ment formula.56 Some believe that sales at destination should be included
to reﬂect the contribution of demand to the earning of corporate income.57
Others counter that sales at destination have no place in the formula, be-
cause income is created where production occurs. They also note that cur-
rent international rules for dividing income place no weight on demand
and that sales are already being taxed under the destination-based VAT.
Determining the destination of sales of tangible products would seem
to be relatively straightforward, since destination can be deﬁned as the
place where goods are physically delivered. Even so, some representa-
tives of business prefer that sales be excluded from the apportionment
formula, because of concerns that the destination of sales can be ma-
nipulated and anti-abuse methods required to prevent manipulation
would seriously complicate compliance. By comparison, it is much
more difﬁcult to determine the destination of services and products that
are delivered electronically—a point that has received considerable at-
tention in the context of taxing electronic commerce.58
Some argue that sales at origin would be largely redundant, but oth-
ers note that payroll and property factors do not capture the contribu-
tion of intermediate inputs. Including sales at origin would create op-
portunities for manipulation and reintroduce transfer pricing problems,
one of the issues that motivates interest in the CCCTB and caused rejec-
tion of apportionment based on value added at origin.
However these issues are resolved, it appears to be agreed that only
receipts received from the sale of goods and services in the normal
course of business should be included in the sales factor—and, thus,
that sales of ﬁnancial assets (except by ﬁnancial institutions), as well as
dividends and interest, should not be included.
5.4.5 Administrative Streamlining
If one were designing, anew, a CCCTB that all twenty-seven member
states would apply to all corporations—without the constraints im-
posed by existing legal and administrative structures—there would
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ministrative rules and procedures. Moreover, to simplify compliance
and administration, there would probably also be a one-stop-shop ap-
proach to tax administration so that a group parent could register and
ﬁle the tax return for the entire group with the tax administration where
it is headquartered.59
In fact, each member state has laws—including those governing tax
administration—that must be taken into account in designing the legal
and administrative aspects of the CCCTB.60 For example, there are
twenty-seven sets of laws and rules covering such crucial issues as reg-
istration with tax authorities, ﬁling requirements, the nature and form
of documents and documentation to be submitted, assessment of tax li-
abilities, audit, interpretation of statutes, dispute resolution, the disclo-
sure of taxpayer information, and statutes of limitations. It seems un-
likely that all of these are to be swept away and replaced by a single set
of laws and rules, especially if participation in CCCTB is optional for
both member states and corporations. Moreover, member states may be
reluctant to give up the symbolism of requiring resident corporations
and PEs to ﬁle tax returns. Commission Services has concluded that,
“harmonising rules for calculating the corporate tax base does not nec-
essarily require an overall harmonisation of the tax administration and
procedural rules.” It continues, however, “since the CCCTB is being de-
signed as consolidated some procedures will need to be done in the
same way by all participating MS and it is important to identify these.”61
Even so, this work remains at an early stage, in part because decisions in
this area may be dependent on decisions on substantive issues.62
Implementation of the CCCTB—however it is achieved—would
likely involve unprecedented reliance on the tax authorities of other
member states, something that some member states (especially the large
ones, which would have the most revenue at stake) may be loath to ac-
cept. This concern is heightened by the fact that a corporation would
have an incentive to locate group headquarters in member states where
administrative procedures (e.g., the statute of limitations) are lax or
where it has little other economic activity, because the tax administra-
tion of such a member state would have relatively little reason to care
about the accuracy of its tax returns or to audit those returns with dili-
gence.63It, thus, seems likely that member states will insist on the power
to object to the decisions of the tax authorities of other member states
and perhaps perform their own audits. Similarly, member states may be
reluctant to entrust their ﬁscal health to the courts of other member
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specialized EC tax court may develop.64
5.4.6 Jurisdiction to Tax: A Largely Neglected Issue
If the rule for jurisdiction to tax and the formula used to apportion in-
come are not mutually consistent, there may be nowhere income—income
that would be apportioned to a member state that lacks jurisdiction to
tax it. Under the terms of many tax treaties and the domestic laws of
many countries, a nation can tax the business income of a corporation
only if the corporation maintains a permanent establishment (PE) in the
nation. If a corporate group makes sales in a member state where it lacks
a PE, the interplay of this nexus rule and the use of sales to apportion in-
come could clearly result in nowhere income. It is possible, but less
likely, that the group could have payroll and property in the member
state without having a PE there. On the other hand, substitution of a dif-
ferent rule for jurisdiction to tax would run counter to existing treaties
with non-EC countries, as well as long-standing practices.
This issue seems to have been overlooked until recently. However, in
late September 2007, Commission Services asked, “is a ‘physical pres-
ence’in the form of a subsidiary or permanent establishment required or
is an ‘economic presence’in the form of a minimum presence of at least
one of the factors in the allocation formula sufﬁcient?”65It went on to ob-
serve:
Revolutionary as it may look at ﬁrst sight, this concept: (i) is coherent with the
idea that “demand” is one of the income generating factors (thus, demand, be-
yond a certain threshold, would give to the marketing jurisdiction the rights to
tax part of the corporate income of the selling company); (ii) would make any at-
tempt from companies to manipulate the place of shipment less effective in
terms of factor shifting; (iii) would reﬂect the increasing economic importance
of e-commerce and trans-border provision of services and (iv) would eliminate
or at least signiﬁcantly reduce the need for “throw-back” or “throw-out rules”.66
Commission Services ultimately concluded at that time, “while an ap-
proach based on ‘economic presence’ may have conceptual appeal and
would be the most coherent one when a ‘sales by destination’factor was
introduced, it may at this point in time be a step too far. Taxable nexus
might at least initially therefore continue to be based on a physical pres-
ence in a MS (i.e., a subsidiary or PE) to attribute a share of the tax base
to that MS.”67It would address the issue of a “nowhere income” by allo-
cating sales made into a member state where a group does not have a
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group in proportion to the other two apportionment factors (payroll and
property).68
5.5 International Issues
Flows of income that cross borders between EC members states partici-
pating in CCCTB and other nations, including non-participating EC
member states, pose mind-boggling problems. Indeed, the problems are
so daunting that the CCCCTB working group has deferred considera-
tion of the issues raised by the possibility that not all member states may
participate in CCCTB, focusing instead on income ﬂows to and from
non-EC nations.
International issues arise in two different situations: income is earned
outside the CCCTB bloc by entities resident in the bloc (foreign-source
income from out-bound investment) and EC-source income is earned on
in-bound investment in the CCCTB bloc by entities resident elsewhere.
Income ﬂowing across borders can be either active (i.e., income from di-
rect investments) or passive (e.g., interest and dividends on portfolio in-
vestments and royalties). Either in-bound or out-bound direct invest-
ment can be made through subsidiaries or through branches (PEs).
Part 5.5.1 examines the taxation of foreign-source income under the
CCCTB. Part 5.5.2 discusses the proper role of residence-based taxation
within the EC, an issue that would arise even if all member states par-
ticipated in CCCTB and only intra-EC income ﬂows were at issue. Part
5.5.3 discusses the tax treatment of income from inbound investment
under the CCCTB, and part 5.5.4 the need to renegotiate treaties.
5.5.1 Taxation of Income from Foreign Investment
If it is assumed that the non-EC country where income originates (the
source country) taxes business income that crosses international bor-
ders, there are two ways to avoid double taxation of such foreign-source
income, by both the source country and the country of residence of the
corporate recipient of the income. The residence country can exempt
foreign-source income or it can tax the income but allow credits (com-
monly called foreign tax credits or FTCs) for taxes paid to source coun-
tries. The OECD Model Tax Treaty provides both methods of avoiding
double taxation, without expressing preference for either.
Reaching agreement on how to treat foreign-source income in the
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tax such income in the same way (if at all), and (b) most member states
currently have foreign tax treaties with many other nations that restrict
their room to maneuver. About half of member states do not tax foreign-
source business income; they achieve this either by employing an explic-
itly territorial system under which only domestic-source income is
taxed or by exempting foreign-source business income—despite osten-
sibly taxing the worldwide income of their residents. The other half tax
foreign-source income, preventing double taxation by allowing credits
for taxes paid to source countries.69 Commission Services has suggested
that the choice between these approaches represents such a fundamental
element of national tax policy that an obligation to switch methods might
limit the number of member states interested in adopting the CCCTB.70
In principle, there seem to be three basic ways foreign-source income
could be treated under the CCCTB. In fact, the ﬁrst two—which involve
no taxation by member states of residence of corporate groups—may be
political non starters because member states that currently tax the
worldwide income of their residents are unlikely to accept the implied
revenue loss. First, foreign-source income could simply be exempt from
taxation in the EC. That is, only income earned in (participating) EC
member states would be included in CCCTB, as under the territorial sys-
tem. Besides reﬂecting current trends in thinking on taxation of interna-
tional income ﬂows, this approach has the virtue of simplicity.71
Second, foreign-source income could be included in the CCCTB and
thus apportioned among Member States.72 No economic model would
suggest using apportionment values based on activities in the EC to ap-
portion foreign-source income, particularly that from foreign direct in-
vestment. More important, in addition to the political problems noted
above, there would be technical problems in implementing it. In partic-
ular, providing relief from double taxation would be extremely compli-
cated, as bilateral treaties signed by the country of residence of the cor-
poration receiving income would have no relevance for other member
states, to which some income would be apportioned.
The third approach—which many experts seem to favor for practical
reasons—would exclude foreign-source income from the CCCTB, leav-
ing it for member states of residence of corporations receiving such in-
come to decide whether or not to tax it and how to relieve double taxa-
tion.73 While this approach has the considerable political advantages of
preserving the taxing powers of member states that tax the worldwide
income of their residents and the technical advantage of meshing most
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Table 5.3
Proposed Tax Treatment of Foreign-source Income Received by EC Resident or PE
Income from EC Member State Income from non-EC Country
Income from PE Consolidated Basic rule: exemption
Income from major share- Share ownership > 75 percent: Secondary rule (for income 
holding Consolidated  from low-tax countries): 
Share ownership of 10-75 percent: taxation under CCCTB, with 
Exemption shared foreign tax credits (or 
CFC regime for subsidiaries)
Portfolio dividends Taxation under CCCTB, with  Taxation under CCCTB, with 
Other passive income shared foreign tax credits for  shared foreign tax credits
withholding taxes (unless 
consolidated, e.g., in case of 
interest and royalties)
Source: CEC (2007c, 30–35)
easily with current treaty obligations, it may become increasingly un-
tenable in the long run, because of its implications for the role of resi-
dence-based taxation, discussed in the next subsection.
In late September 2007, Commission Services revealed its current (al-
beit tentative) thinking on these issues, which is summarized in table
5.3. The ﬁrst column distinguishes four types of income and the ﬁrst row
whether the income has its source in the EC or elsewhere.
Exemption would be the basic rule for the income of non-EC PEs and
dividends from major shareholdings outside the EC (direct foreign in-
vestment). Exemption is chosen over taxation with foreign tax credits to
avoid the complexity of the latter, which requires recalculation of the
proﬁts of foreign subsidiaries under the income tax rules of the country
granting the credit. If, however, the tax rate in the source country fell be-
low some minimum, exemption might be replaced by either taxation
under the CCCBT, with foreign tax credits for corporate income taxes
and withholding taxes levied by the source country (the cost of which
would be shared in the same way as the tax base) or (for income from
foreign subsidiaries) a controlled foreign corporation (CFC) regime—
under which foreign-source income would be taxed currently, rather
than when received as dividends.
Income of PEs located in the EC would automatically be included in
consolidated income, and dividends from EC subsidiaries where share-
holding exceeds 75 percent would be ignored, because of consolidation.
In the case of shareholding between 10 and 75 percent, dividends would
be exempt. Commission Services does not propose that the secondary
rule proposed for income from investment in low-tax non-EC countriesalso be applied to dividends from low-tax EC member states, because it
is unclear whether its application would be legal.74
Portfolio dividends (those where shareholding falls below the 10 per-
cent threshold) and other passive income received from non-EC sources
would be included in the CCCTB and credits (shared in the same way)
would be allowed for withholding taxes of source countries. The same
rule would apply to portfolio dividends and other passive income re-
ceived from EC sources, except in the case of passive income (e.g., inter-
est and royalties) ﬂowing between two members of a consolidated
group, which would be ignored.
5.5.2 The Role of Residence-based Taxation within the EC
Many believe that residence-based taxation has no place within an eco-
nomically integrated union. They argue that residence is meaningless in
such a context, that residence can easily be manipulated if taxation de-
pends on it, that it would be extraordinarily difﬁcult to implement the
foreign tax credits that would be required to avoid double taxation, and
that the economic effects of residence-based taxation are less desirable
than those of source-based taxation.75 The last of these arguments de-
serves further consideration.
Academic economists have long favored capital export neutrality
(CEN) over capital import neutrality (CIN).76 Under CEN, the tax paid
on income from business and capital would depend only on the place of
residence of the investor, not the location of investment. Thus, it would
lead to the optimal allocation of investment and thereby the maximiza-
tion of worldwide income. CEN could be achieved either (a) if there
were no source-based taxation, or (b) if residence countries taxed world-
wide income, but gave credits for source-country taxes.
CIN would occur if all investment in a given jurisdiction were taxed
identically, without regard to the residence of the investor. It would be
achieved if only source-based taxes were levied, as under territorial sys-
tems. CIN has commonly been advocated primarily by representatives
of business, who note that it is necessary for the creation of a level play-
ing ﬁeld for business operating within any one country. An apportion-
ment-based system of taxing corporate income that attempts to tax in-
come where it is deemed to originate is inherently a source-based tax
and thus consistent with CIN but not CEN.
Recent years have seen a remarkable change in the viewpoint of many
economists, especially those writing about taxation in economic unions.
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those competing in a particular jurisdiction to pay different amounts of
tax on a given amount of income derived from investment in that juris-
diction, depending merely on their place of residence.77 Some have also
argued that residence-based taxation violates the freedoms guaranteed
by the EC Treaty.
Regardless how these conceptual and theoretical arguments play out,
it seems unlikely that EC member states that currently tax the world-
wide income of their residents—in particular the United Kingdom,
which dislikes CCCTB on other grounds—will gladly give up doing so.
A more interesting question is whether member states that are inter-
ested in participating in CCCTB would be willing to forego residence-
based taxation of business income and adopt one of the ﬁrst two options
for taxing foreign-source income described above.
5.5.3 Taxation of Income from In-Bound Investment
There is relatively little disagreement that most business income originat-
ing in participating member states of the EC should be included in the CC-
CTB. Rather, questions in this area involve the deﬁnition of consolidated
groups and treaty issues. For example, if a foreign parent has sister sub-
sidiaries in different member states, should those subsidiaries be consoli-
dated into one group, or should there be multiple groups? If a parent
headquartered in the EC has a foreign subsidiary that owns a subsidiary
in the EC, should the EC subsidiary be included in the same consolidated
group as the EC parent? Should PEs operating in the EC be lumped to-
gether with EC subsidiaries of foreign corporations? More inclusive deﬁ-
nitions may impede tax planning, but may encounter objections from
treaty partners since virtually all treaties are based on SA/ALS.
Commission Services has recently provided its views on the owner-
ship arrangements described above. Consolidation would be manda-
tory for parents, qualiﬁed subsidiaries (those with 75 percent or more of
voting rights commonly owned, either directly or indirectly), and PEs in
the following situations:
• An EU resident parent and its EU resident subsidiaries and PEs:
• A group of EU resident subsidiaries and/or PEs under the common
control of a non-EU resident parent; and
• Aparent that owns a non-EU resident subsidiary and a second tier EU
resident subsidiary owned by the ﬁrst-tier non-EU resident subsidiary.78
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allocate income among member states may raise treaty issues, even if
the CCCTB is limited to the “water’s edge” of the EC, as Commission
Services proposes. Sorensen (2004, 95) provides the example of an in-
crease in the transfer price of sales by a U.S. parent to its French sub-
sidiary mandated by the U.S. IRS. Under present rules for mutual ad-
justment procedures, France should reduce the taxable proﬁts of the
French subsidiary in order to prevent double taxation. But under CC-
CTB, if France were to agree to an adjustment, the reduction in proﬁts
would be spread among all participating member states where the sub-
sidiary’s consolidated group does business. As Sorensen notes, to pre-
vent such ﬁscal externalities, “a far-reaching rethinking of tax treaty re-
lations may be needed.”
As a second example, suppose that a foreign corporation owns
branches or subsidiaries in two member states. Compared to the situa-
tion under SA/ALS, CCCTB may reallocate income from a branch or
subsidiary in one member state to a branch or subsidiary in another
member state.79
5.5.4 Renegotiating Treaties
As the preceding discussion indicates, the CCCTB project raises impor-
tant and difﬁcult treaty issues. Solving some of them may require rene-
gotiation of treaties—a long, difﬁcult, and uncertain process. Commis-
sion Services has recognized that it may be necessary to provide
temporary derogations from some of the proposed rules described
above.80 It would perhaps be most efﬁcient—but probably also take
longer—if renegotiation were to occur in a multilateral context in which
all member states interested in CCCTB entered into a single set of nego-
tiations with a given treaty partner. Under an extreme scenario, a single
EC treaty would replace bilateral treaties.
At this point it is premature to speculate on the substantive issues that
would need to be renegotiated, as these depend on decisions taken
about the international aspects of CCCTB. But the likely contours of CC-
CTB may also depend on the unknown prospects of renegotiating
treaties to accommodate CCCTB.
5.6 The Political-Juridical Context
In order to create a single internal market, the EC Treaty guarantees free-
dom of movement of goods, capital, people, and services; freedom of es-
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the ECJ has struck down various aspects of the tax laws of member
states, including thin capitalization rules and imputation systems
(which provide relief from double taxation of dividends). While such ac-
tions are sometimes said to involve negative harmonization (in con-
tradistinction to legislated positive harmonization), it is clear that the
result is not necessarily a harmonized system. True harmonization
requires legislative action.
The EC Treaty provides that unanimous agreement of all member
states is required to enact EC tax policies. Since this implies that each
member state has a veto, it is hardly surprising that only a few directives
involving direct taxation have ever been adopted. The unanimity rule
also suggests that the prospects for corporate tax harmonization initially
involving all member states are not bright.
Recognizing this reality, László Kovács, European Commissioner for
Taxation and Customs, has said, “the best-case scenario would be a
unanimous agreement on a common consolidated tax base and its 
EC-wide application by all member states. If unanimity will not be
achieved, the Commission will examine the possibility of resorting to
the enhanced cooperation mechanism.81 Under this approach as few as
eight member states could agree to harmonize their corporate tax sys-
tems.82 It is in this context that the Commission launched the CCCTB
Working Group in 2004, promising to have a legislative proposal ready
for introduction by the end of 2008.
It may be useful to describe brieﬂy the role of the Commission (and its
staff), since it has no analog in the United States. The EC Treaty assigns
to the Commission, as the executive body of the European Union, ex-
clusive responsibility for preparing proposals for legislation to be en-
acted by the Council (which shares legislative power with the European
Parliament in some matters, but not taxation). Commission Services, the
staff of the Commission, chairs meetings of the Working Group, sets the
agenda, and prepares the documents to be discussed. These documents
represent only the preliminary views of Commission Services, which
may change in response to both further analysis and input from experts,
including members of the Working Group. Of course, Commission Ser-
vices makes only technical judgements; it does not make political deci-
sions. The position of the Commission will not be known until it pre-
sents its ﬁnal proposals for harmonization.
The mechanism of enhanced cooperation creates an interesting dy-
namic.83 Although some member states may prefer that harmonization
not proceed and may try to block it, they may not be able to prevent its
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states can agree to implement a mutually acceptable version of the CC-
CTB, that action will cast a long shadow—that corporate tax harmo-
nization will, for the foreseeable future, take that version as its starting
point. Thus even member states that oppose harmonization have an in-
centive to participate in the CCCTB Working Group, if only as a defen-
sive measure, in order to try to forestall inclusion of provisions that they
would ﬁnd objectionable, either now or in the event that they decide
later to join the CCCTB club. This conjecture is borne out by the fact that
representatives of all member states have been participating in the ac-
tivities of the Working Group.
Supposing that at least eight member states can agree to adopt the CC-
CTB, it is conceivable that a judicial hurdle may remain. The ECJ has de-
ﬁned discrimination as treating similar situations differently or differ-
ent situations similarly. One can imagine that non participating member
states will argue that application of the CCCTB among participating
member states is discriminatory.84
It is impossible to know whether, when, or how the CCCTB will ever
be enacted and whether the ECJ will sustain it, if enacted. In another
context (McLure forthcoming) I offered the following (somewhat re-
dacted) prediction:
[T]he fact that the corporate income tax systems of Member States differ so dra-
matically from what is required for an internal market may actually turn out to
be positive....   [I]t seems almost inconceivable that the Member States will con-
tinue indeﬁnitely to employ SA/ALS to isolate income earned in various loca-
tions; at some point even the most diehard advocates of SA/ALS are likely to ad-
mit that “this ain’t working” and agree that a shift to consolidation and formula
apportionment is needed. At that point much of the rest of the source-based sys-
tem . . . (a uniform system of apportionment, agreement on whether all income
should be apportioned, the criteria for consolidation, etc.) may fall into place
and the need for a common deﬁnition of income and the artiﬁciality of continu-
ing residence-based taxation will become more apparent. In the meantime
preparatory work initiated by the Commission (notably via the CCCTB Work-
ing Group) will have greased the skids for this to happen, perhaps initially via
enhanced cooperation.
This optimistic appraisal is conﬁrmed by a recent survey of the tax of-
ﬁcials of 403 large corporations doing business in more than one EC
member state. Seventy-eight percent of respondents favored adoption of
the CCCTB, even though details of the scheme have not been made
public, and almost as many (69 percent) would like to see a single rate ap-
plied throughout the EC. In some countries 100 percent of those surveyed
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half or respondents favored it. Sixty-six percent of interviewees thought
CCCTB would be in place by 2015, and 85 expected to see it by 2020. Only
15 percent thought harmonization would never occur (KPMG 2007).
5.7 Implications of Harmonization
To a large degree the implications of harmonization are inherent in the
description of the problems that plague SA/ALS and the characteristics
of consolidation/formula apportionment.
5.7.1 Simpliﬁcation
Adoption of CCCTB would bring considerable simpliﬁcation, and with
it signiﬁcant reductions in costs of compliance and administration. The
availability of a single deﬁnition of apportionable income and elimina-
tion of the need to document, defend, and monitor transfer prices on
transactions among members of a participating corporate group doing
business in participating member states and subject to consolidation
would be particularly important sources of simpliﬁcation. Simpliﬁca-
tion and cost savings will be greater, the larger the number of countries
that participate in CCCTB. And, of course, they will exist only for cor-
porate groups that opt to participate in the harmonized system and be
greatest for groups subject to consolidation.
5.7.2 Loss Offset/Elimination of Double Taxation
Like simpliﬁcation, the automatic availability of full loss offset and the
elimination of double taxation, all inherent in CCCTB, would reduce im-
pediments to cross-border economic activity—at least among partici-
pating member states and groups subject to consolidation.
5.7.3 Effects on Revenues
Member states participating in CCCTB are likely to experience several
types of effects on revenues.85 First, substitution of consolidation cum
apportionment for SA/ALS will reduce opportunities to shift income to
low-tax member states and interest deductions to high-tax member
states. Of course, this is true only to the extent that low-tax and high-tax
member states participate in CCCTB. Since it seems fairly likely that the
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participate and some high-tax member states may not, substantial op-
portunities for income shifting and borrowing in high-tax member
states will likely remain. But, as noted earlier, participation in CCCTB
would free up administrative resources for more aggressive monitoring
of transfer prices.
Leaving aside the revenue effects associated with the reduction of op-
portunities for tax planning just mentioned, the shift from SA/ALS to
consolidation cum apportionment will also likely cause some redistrib-
ution of tax bases among participating member states. It is difﬁcult to
generalize about the directions and amount of such redistribution, as it
would depend on the apportionment formula chosen.86 Lack of cer-
tainty on this score may be fueling some preference for an apportion-
ment formula based on macro factors.
If adoption of CCCTB were to foster rate-based tax competition, ag-
gregate tax revenues of member states—including those that chose not
to participate in CCCTB—might be adversely affected. Of course, tax
competition might also be manifested in redistribution of tax bases
among member states.
5.7.4 Economic Effects
A reduction in economic distortions—other than those caused by elim-
ination of tax-related impediments to cross-border investment such as
complexity, compliance costs, lack of loss offset, and double taxation—
may be the “dog that did not bark” in the tax harmonization story.87That
is, if corporate income taxes are harmonized and tax rates are not
changed, distortions of the location of economic activity (as indicated by
differences in marginal effective tax rates; METRs) might increase, not
decrease. This would depend crucially on the apportionment formula
chosen. For example, the greater the weight placed on property, relative
to sales, the higher the METR for a given statutory tax rate. Any increase
in differences in METRs could, of course, be offset—or more than off-
set—by corresponding changes in tax rates. But that is a question of tax
rate policy, not tax harmonization. It thus seems that tax harmoniza-
tion’s most certain contribution to achievement of the Lisbon goal “to
become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based econ-
omy” would be elimination of the aforementioned impediments to
cross-border investment.
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The EC’s Lisbon goal that ostensibly motivates interest in the CCCTB
might suggest that non-EC nations should not welcome adoption of the
CCCTB—indeed, that they should try to undermine it, for example,
through intransigence in treaty negotiations. It seems, however, that this
is wrong on several counts. First, the rest of the world probably does not
beneﬁt much, if at all, from the economic inefﬁciencies caused by tax-
induced impediments to the creation of a single market in the European
Community. Rather, it may beneﬁt from the spillovers generated if cor-
porate tax harmonization helps foster a more dynamic business envi-
ronment within the EC.
Second, if—as seems likely—statutory tax rates were adjusted to
keep revenues more or less constant, competitive effects are likely to be
minimal. EC Member States will be more competitive, for a given con-
stellation of statutory tax rates, the greater the weight placed on desti-
nation-based factors such as sales, relative to origin-based factors such
as payroll, property, and value added at origin.88
Finally, if all member states were to participate in CCCTB, the incen-
tive to move real economic activity or to shift income (with no change in
the location of economic activity) to low-tax member states such as Ire-
land would be blunted, as any income earned in (or shifted to) any EC
Member State would be apportioned among the member states and thus
subject to an average tax rate of the member states, not that of the mem-
ber state to which economic activity or income was shifted. While this
would be good news for ﬁscal authorities of non-EC nations, it would
not be such good news for foreign multinational enterprises. Of course,
if low-tax member states do not join the CCCTB system, the incentives
to shift economic activity or income from both participating member
states and outside the EC to those non participating member states
would not be much affected, except to the extent that high-tax member
states might be more competitive than now. And the CCCTB would do
nothing to reduce opportunities and incentives to shift income to non-
EC tax havens; indeed, these incentives would be relatively greater if all
member states were to participate in the CCCTB.
In short, while generalization is difﬁcult, in the absence of knowledge
of the apportionment formula to be chosen, it seems unlikely that tax
harmonization would create strong incentives for non-EC nations to re-
duce their statutory tax rates.
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Switching from SA/ALS to consolidation cum apportionment would
entail enormous transition costs that might last over many years, if not
decades. Transition costs may be somewhat eased by making participa-
tion optional for corporate groups. On the other hand, making it op-
tional for member states may aggravate these costs by stretching out
transition over several episodes of adoption. Thus far the CCCTB Work-
ing Group seems not to have devoted much attention to this issue. Of
course, it is impossible to work out rules for transition until the basic de-
cisions have been reached on the form CCCTB will take.
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Notes
1. The terms corporate income tax and corporations are employed here to refer to what are
sometimes called company income taxes and companies in European literature. Commis-
sion Services deﬁnes eligible companies as those subject to the types of taxes listed in an
annex that it does not include; see CEC (2007c, 5).
2. For elaboration of this argument, see McLure (2007; forthcoming), as well as CEC
(2001b; 2002). Because tax reform involves only the ﬁrst (economic) “pillar” of the Euro-
pean Union (EU), most references in this article are to the European Community, rather
than to the EU, which would be equally accurate.
184 McLureAs explained in section 5.6, it is important to distinguish (as is done here) between the
views of the European Commission and those of its staff, Commission Services. Both ap-
pear in publications of the Commission. For convenience, references in the text and foot-
notes to publications attributed to the Commission of the European Communities in the
list of references have been shortened to CEC.
3. For a somewhat outdated compendium of decisions of the ECJ involving direct taxa-
tion and the creation of a single market, see Mason (2005). All ECJ decisions issued in the
last ten years are available on the Court’s website, http:/ /curia.europa.eu/index.htm,
which also provides references to previous decisions.
4. The conclusions of the Lisbon meeting are available at: http:/ /europa.eu.int/ISPO/
docs/services/docs/2000/jan-march/doc_00_8_en.html#A. Emphasis in original.
5. CEC (2001b, 3).
6. See CEC (2003, 3; 2004a, 1).
7. Avi-Yonah and Clausing (2007) have proposed a similar system for use by the United
States in the taxation of corporate income. For analyses of such a system, see McLure (2002)
and Roin (2007).
8. CEC (2001b). As Sørensen (2004) notes, this is a very different form of harmonization from
what the Commission has suggested in the past. Devereux (2004) describes earlier Commis-
sion efforts at harmonization. The Commission also outlined three other alternatives in this
communication, only the third of which (home-state taxation) it thought might be viable at
this time: a community-level corporate tax; mandatory application of a system similar to the
CCCTB to all corporate taxpayers; and a system in which an agreed-upon formula would be
used to apportion group income, which would be measured under the tax laws of the home
state of the parent of each corporate group. Interest in the CCCTB has far out-distanced that
in home-state taxation. There is, however, some interest in making home state taxation avail-
able to small and medium-sized enterprises. That option is not discussed here.
9. See CEC (2001b; 2004a). Expressing the views of business, Andersson (2007) and Baren-
feld (2007) strongly advocate making taxation under the CCCTB optional. But they, like
many others, believe that participation by a corporate group should be an all-or-nothing
choice—that is, that the entire group should be subject to CCCTB or none of it should be.
Otherwise, many of the problems of SA/ALS described below would remain.
10. See CEC (2004c). The reports of the working group and its subgroups are available on
the website of the Taxation and Customs Union Directorate of the European Commission.
11. Of course, many other factors could be at play—including cyclical developments, eco-
nomic growth spurred by rate reductions, and the fact that ﬁgures reported for tax rates
and tax revenues as a percent of GDP do not cover the same years. A detailed analysis of
the causes of the divergent trends in statutory tax rates and tax revenues as a percent of
GDP is well beyond the scope of this chapter.
12. The example could easily be complicated by (a) inserting ﬁgures for the division of in-
come of the two corporations (and thus the consolidated group) among the three jurisdic-
tions, as determined by separate accounting; and (b) comparing those with the distribu-
tion of the tax base under apportionment, with or without consolidation. Since the focus
of the illustration is on the mechanics of apportionment and consolidation, this is not done.
13. It could be noted that jurisdiction 1 beneﬁts signiﬁcantly from consolidation, relative to
non consolidation (a 17 percent increase in the tax base of the group), while jurisdiction 2
Harmonizing Corporate Income Taxes in the European Community 185gains a small amount (just under one percent), and jurisdiction 3 loses a signiﬁcant amount
(roughly 8.5 percent). This is not a particularly interesting ﬁnding, even aside from the fact
that is depends on the underlying assumptions, as it seems quite unlikely that the EC will
seriously consider adopting apportionment without consolidation.
14. See CEC (2001b; 2002); Mintz (1999); Devereux (2004); Sorensen (2004); McLure (2007;
forthcoming); Andersson (2007); and Barenfeld (2007). Despite cataloging these defects,
Roin (2007) is skeptical that a formula-based system would perform any better if adopted
as the international norm.
15. Mintz (2004) argues that simpliﬁcation—not reductions in tax-induced distortions of
economic decisions—is the primary reason to undertake harmonization of corporate in-
come taxes in the EC. Barenfeld (2007) focuses on the potential for the CCCTB to reduce
complexity and uncertainty and warns that, as adopted, the CCCTB may not be as simple
as it could be.
16. Andersson (2007) reviews literature on the relationship between uncertainty and in-
vestment.
17. As a result, the income of controlled foreign corporations (CFCs) is ordinarily taxed by
the country where the corporate parent is resident only when distributed (if at all). Under
certain circumstances—in order to prevent abusive deferral of home-country taxation—
the income of certain CFCs is treated as though distributed to the parent and is thus taxed
currently. For example, under the U.S. tax code Subpart F income of certain CFCs is ac-
corded this treatment. See Arnold and Dibout (2001).
18. This is somewhat of an overstatement. In the case of imports and exports, rules are re-
quired to determine where sales are deemed to occur for tax purposes.
19. See McLure (1997) and references cited there. Not surprisingly these are two of the
four industries listed in note 20.
20. As Weiner (2006) notes, Honohan and Walsh (2002, 54) describe the industries in-
volved (cola concentrate manufacturers, pharmaceuticals, software reproduction, and
computer components) as having the “unusual characteristics of the entrepôt economy,”
namely “large . . . quantities of goods are imported and then reexported, often with mini-
mal or no processing.” Huizinga and Laeven (2006) provide estimates of proﬁt shifting in
the EC and provide references to related literature.
21. See Huizinga, Laeven, and Nicodéme (2006) for estimates of the use of debt to shift in-
come within Europe.
22. Lankhorst-Hohorst GMBH v. Finanzamt Steinfurt, Case C-324/00, 12 December 2002.
23. Source-based taxation of business proﬁts, found in the tax laws of virtually all countries,
is consistent with the OECD Model Tax Treaty. As noted in section 5 below, residence coun-
tries commonly avoid double taxation of such income by exempting it or by allowing cred-
its for income and withholding taxes paid to source countries. The EC interest and royalties
directive (Council Directive 2003/49/EC of 3 June 2003) and the parent-subsidiary directive
(Directive 90/435/EEC, as amended by Council Directive 2003/123/EC of 22 December
2003) provide that member states where these types of payments originate will not impose
withholding taxes on them when paid to a company organized in another member state.
24. Relief is automatically available in all member states for domestic losses within one
company. In eighteen member states, offset is also available under speciﬁc rules for do-
mestic losses within a group of companies, and in seventeen offset is available for cross-
186 McLureborder losses within a single company. (Some of the eighteen member states in the former
group do not belong to the latter group of seventeen, and vice versa.) By comparison, loss
offset is generally not available for cross-border losses within a group of companies, ex-
cept in four member states (Austria, Denmark, France, and Italy). This description disre-
gards Bulgaria and Romania, which joined the EC in 2007. See CEC (2006b; 2006c) and, for
a summary. Weiner (2006, 18–20).
25. Marks & Spencer v David Halsey, Case C-446/03, 13 December 2005.
26. Whether gaps and overlaps in taxation of EC-source income would remain would de-
pend in part on the rules for jurisdiction to tax and the apportionment formula chosen. For
example, as noted below, if jurisdiction to tax continues to be based on the presence of a
PE, as seems likely, but sales (at destination) is one of the apportionment factors, income
may be assigned to a member state that lacks jurisdiction to tax it.
27. This example is taken, with modiﬁcation, from McLure (2004).
28. If not seven of the member states in this example participated in CCCTB, SA/ALS
would be used to divide income between participating and non participating member
states, as well as between corporations operating in the EC and those operating elsewhere.
29. See McLure (1980).
30. See McLure (2004) for a discussion of the third type of issues.
31. See CEC (2002, 2).
32. CEC (2004a, 3).
33.Pethig and Wagener (2007) provide a formal analysis of such propositions.
34. McLure (2007) elaborates on this view.
35. For a background discussion of the second and third issues prepared by a member of
the Commission staff, see Agúndez-García (2006). There has been some consideration of
adopting a common tax base before consolidation and formula apportionment. While a
common tax base would, by itself, produce some simpliﬁcation, this two-step process
would fail to achieve many of the most important objectives of the CCCTB. See CEC
(2004a, 2–3).
36. Reading the tea leaves to discern the likely contours of harmonization is difﬁcult, and
not only because the tea is being brewed in Brussels and the leaves are being read in Cali-
fornia. The Commission has not yet announced its ﬁnal positions on most features of the
CCCTB, and the preliminary views of its staff (Commission Services) have no legal force
and may shift over time. Moreover, Commission Services reports views expressed by ex-
perts, as well as its own, often without attempting to distill a consensus—which would not
be binding on it, in any event. See also section 5.6.
37. CEC (2007c)
38. See CEC (2007c, 5) This document is the source for most of the generalizations re-
garding the deﬁnition of income that follow.
39. CEC (2007c, 14–19)
40. CEC (2007c, 19–20)
41. CEC (2007d, 2)
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43. CEC (2007d, 2)
44. CEC (2007c, 31). This scheme is summarized in section 5.5.1.
45. In the United States, intercorporate dividends are commonly taxed as business income
by the state of commercial domicile of the taxpayer receiving them. Of course, states that
allow or require combined reporting eliminate dividends ﬂowing within a combined
group. On the other hand, states that do not allow combination may include dividends
deemed to be part of income from a unitary business in the apportionable income of the
recipient.
46. The criteria for opting in and out of CCCTB and for consolidation can be summarized
as follows:
• Participation in CCCTB would be optional for all corporations and corporate groups,
subject to the following rules:
• Members of corporate groups with common ownership of more than 50 percent must
all opt either to participate or not participate.
• Corporate groups that opt to participate must consolidate the activities of corporate
members with common ownership of more than 75 percent.
• Corporate groups with common ownership of 50–75 percent would not be allowed to
consolidate.
For purposes of calculating the percentage of indirect ownership in multi-tiered organ-
izations, common ownership of 75 percent or more of a given subsidiary would be treated
as 100 percent ownership and common ownership of less than 50 percent would be as-
signed a value of zero; Representatives of business and several member states have ques-
tioned the desirability of having two thresholds. Business has suggested having a single
threshold of 50 percent for both opting in and for mandatory consolidation. See CEC
(2007c, 23). Rules would, of course, be needed to govern situations in which (a) individual
entities either enter or exit a consolidated group or (b) levels of ownership change during
the year; see CEC (2007c, 6, 24–27).
47. Hellerstein and McLure (2004a; 2004b) examine the pros and cons of the two ap-
proaches.
48. Commission Services stresses that “an apportioning formula should be enforceable,
simple and cost effective. At the same time the factors to be chosen should not be prone to
manipulation and should lead to a fair apportionment of the tax base.” See CEC (2007d, 2).
49. This simple example does not allow for the possibility that not all member states par-
ticipate in CCCTB and that the corporate group may not be active in all (participating)
member states. For a more complete criticism of the use of macro factors, see McLure (2004).
50. See CEC (2007a, 3–4; 2007c, 2).
51. See CEC (2007a, 4–5; 2007c, 2).
52. See CEC (2007a, 6–10; 2007d, 7–10).
53. See CEC (2007d, 2–5) and (2007f, 7).
54. See Musgrave (1984) for a discussion of these alternatives.
188 McLure55. See CEC (2007d, 5–7).
56. See CEC (2007d, 7–10).
57. Musgrave (1984) also discusses this.
58. See, for example, OECD (2004).
59. Business strongly advocates a one-stop-shop approach; see Andersson (2007) and
Barenfeld (2007). Commission Services also recognizes its advantages; see CEC (2006g).
60. See CEC (2006f). No member state has laws of the type required to govern the appor-
tionment of the tax base.
61. CEC (2006f)
62. See CEC (2006g).
63. Commission Services has noted
The comfort of the CCCTB taxpayers could be increased by agreeing on a common ap-
proach to some elements of the audit procedure, for example, a common maximum length
of the audit or common statute of limitation. Such a measure would at the same time de-
crease the scope for tax planning by choosing an administration with the most generous
procedural rules. A common statute of limitation is particularly important for tax admin-
istrations in order to avoid being blocked by too generous legislation in one participating
MS (CEC 2006f).
64. Commission Services has noted that—since the CCCTB would be speciﬁed in EC leg-
islation to be transposed into the national law of member states—the ECJ would be com-
petent to issue preliminary rulings on its legality and its interpretation in national laws.
See CEC (2006f).
65. CEC (2007d, 10–11).
66. CEC (2007d, 11). Commission Services notes that in the United States the Multistate
Tax Commission (MTC) has endorsed this solution. The MTC (2003) identiﬁes McLure
(2000) as the source of this idea.
67. CEC (2007d, 12)
68. CEC (2007d, 14).
69. Two member states (France and Denmark) follow the territorial principle, taxing only
income earned on their territory, thus exempting foreign-source income. In principle, all
other member states tax the worldwide income of their corporate residents, but diverge in
what this means in practical terms. Only about half actually tax foreign-source income and
allow foreign tax credits. The other half exempt foreign-source income, producing an ef-
fect similar to territorial taxation. The statement in the text lumps together member states
employing the territorial system and those that tax worldwide income but exempt foreign-
source income. This description, derived from CEC (2005), does not consider the practice
of Bulgaria and Romania, which became member states in 2007.
70. CEC (2006g).
71. See Hellerstein and McLure (2004a), Andersson (2007), and Barenfeld (2007). Com-
mission Services has noted, “relieving double taxation before the CCCTB is apportioned
to participating MS could represent a less complicated solution, i.e. the application of the
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credit method.” See CEC (2006d, 5).
72. The Commission has expressed a preference for this approach (CEC 2007b). Commis-
sion Services now seems to favor exemption, at least for income from PEs and major share-
holders; see CEC (2007c), as summarized in table 5.3.
73. See CEC (2006e; 2006g). Commission Services has noted:
If some MS were to keep the taxation of the worldwide income of their tax residents and
use the credit method for the elimination of double taxation in respect of income included
in the CCCTB while other participating MS were to apply the territoriality principle or use
an exemption method for the elimination of double taxation in respect of the same type of
income, the income would have to be kept outside of the CCCTB and only “pooled” with
the tax base after apportionment in MS with credit method (CEC 2006d, 8).
74. Commission Services cites Advocate General Mengozzi’s opinion in Columbus Con-
tainer, Case C298/05, 29 March 2007, which questioned the legality of Germany’s applica-
tion of a tax/credit regime, rather than the generally applicable exemption, to proﬁts of a
branch in Belgium merely because the proﬁts were subject to a low rate of tax in Belgium.
See CEC (2007c, 31).
75. See McLure (2007) and references therein. These arguments would, of course, not ap-
ply to residence-based taxation imposed by the European Union, but this seems unlikely
to be relevant for the foreseeable future.
76. This preference can be attributed largely to the work of Musgrave; see Richman (1963)
and Musgrave (1969). If tax bases and rates are identical both CEN and CIN are achieved.
The discussion in the text ignores this possibility.
77. See Vogel (1990), Wattel (1996), Martin (1999, 281–83), Kemmeren (2006), and Bond,
Gammie, and Mokkas (2006).
78. CEC (2007c, 22–23). The ﬁrst-tier non-EU resident subsidy would not be included in
the consolidated group.
79. American Chamber of Commerce to the European Union (2006) discusses several pos-
sible scenarios and their implications for creditability of EC taxes in the United States.
80. CEC (2007c, 30, 35).
81. Kovács (2006). Enhanced cooperation can only be undertaken as a last resort and
“must not, among other things, undermine the Internal Market, constitute a barrier to or
a discrimination of trade, distort the conditions of competition, or affect the competences,
rights and obligations of the non-participating Member States.” CEC (2001a, 23; 2001b, 17).
82. Provisions adopted via enhanced cooperation do not become part of the acquis com-
munautaire (the body of EU law accumulated thus far, to which all member states must
subscribe). See McLure (2008) for a more complete discussion of the use of enhanced co-
operation to initiate corporate tax harmonization.
83. For a theoretical analysis of the dynamics of enhanced cooperation, see Bordignon and
Brusco (2006).
84. Taxpayer complaints that the CCCTB discriminates against them may be blunted if
they would have the option of whether to participate.
85. Commission Services has asked the tax administrations of member states to provide
data that will assist in the assessment of revenue effects of adopting CCCTB (CEC 2007e).
190 McLureAlthough Commission Services outlines several scenarios that should be considered, de-
pending on which corporations and corporate groups opt to participate, it does not men-
tion the revenue effects of most of the potential behavioral responses described in the text.
86. In CEC (2007e, 11). Commission Services suggests using the following apportionment
formulas to simulate the revenue effects of the CCCTB:
1/2 Payroll – 1/2 Assets
1/4 Payroll – 1/4 Number of Employees – 1/2 Assets
1/3 Payroll – 1/3 Assets – 1/3 Sales by Destination
1/6 Payroll – 1/6 Number of Employees – 1/3 Assets – 1/3 Sales by Destination
1/3 Payroll – 1/3 Assets – 1/3 Sales by Origin
1/6 Payroll – 1/6 Number of Employees – 1/3 Assets – 1/3 Sales by Origin
87. Reference is, of course, to the non-incident in Arthur Conan Doyle’s “Silver Blaze.” I
am indebted to Walter Hellerstein (2007) for this evocative reference.
88. This statement should be qualiﬁed by adding, “for a given constellation of exchange
rates,” since differences in apportionment formulas may, to a great extent, wash out in dif-
ferences in exchange rates, just like differences in origin- and destination-based value
added taxes.
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